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SocIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF LA w. By Iredell Jenkins. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1980. Pp. xiv, 390. 
Cloth $25; paper $6.95. 
The demands of social reformers during the 1960s and early 
1970s raised important theoretical and practical questions concern-
ing the ability of the law to effect social change. In Social Order and 
the Limits ef Law, Iredell Jenkins attempts to answer such questions 
by developing a "systematic theory of positive law'' (p. ix). Jenkins's 
thesis is that the law must play a limited role in implementing social 
change because it necessarily reflects the larger social order. Efforts 
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to accomplish sweeping social reforms through the law, he argues, 
detach the law from social reality and render the law ineffectual. 
Jenkins's argument that social circumstances create and constrain 
positive law is not new, as the authorities that he cites demonstrate. 1 
But because Jenkins grounds this argument in an original and ambi-
tiously abstract theoretical model, Social Order should prove of spe-
cial, if not exclusive, interest to legal philosophers. 
Jenkins first assembles his theory of positive law. The law, he 
argues, can be fruitfully conceptualized as a product of the relation-
ship between "the ultimate dimensions of being or reality" (p. 26) 
and "regimes of becoming" (p. 42). Four familiar ontological cate-
gories are relied upon as the dimensions of order: the Many, the 
One, Process, and Pattern. In the context of positive law, these cate-
gories refer, respectively, to the "many" individuals who constitute a 
society, the "one" political sovereign that announces the law, the 
changes that occur in that society, and the societal characteristics 
that necessarily endure despite change. Against these four dimen-
sions of order, Jenkins arrays three regimes of becoming, categories 
that describe the future in terms of the present. He labels these re-
gimes "Necessity," "Possibility," and "Purposiveness." Necessity 
describes the aspect of the future that must be, due to unalterable 
physical, economic, or political circumstances. Necessity gives way 
to Possibility where individuals or the state - the many or the one 
- can influence future events. Purposiveness refers to the realm of 
events that individuals or the state have deliberately chosen (pp. 32-
34). 
By placing the "Dimensions of Order" on one axis, and the "Re-
gimes of Becoming" on another, Jenkins constructs his "Matrix of 
Positive Law." At each interstice, he inserts a word or phrase to de-
scribe the outcome that results from the operation of a regime of 
becoming on a dimension of order (p. 42): 
DIMENSIONS 
OF ORDER REGIMES OF BECOMING 
Necessity Possibility Purposiveness 
Many Similarity Differentiation Cultivation 
One Domination- Participation Authority 
Subordination 
Process Action- Self-Determination Responsibility 
Reaction 
Pattern Rigidity Flexibility Continuity 
l. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 181-207 (1961); R. UNGER, LAW IN 
MODERN SOCIETY (1976). 
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Jenkins maintains that "this system of interrelated elements consti-
tutes the matrix from which law emerges and the field within which 
legal action takes place" (p. 57). The task of law, he asserts, is "to 
promote the development of the regime of Purposiveness" - in 
other words, to aid the cultivation of the individual and enhance the 
authority of the state (p. 55). 
Jenkins foresees two basic uses for his highly abstract theory. 
First, the matrix helps understand existing legal decisions because, 
he alleges, jurists implicitly consider the elements of the matrix (p. 
60). Second, and more important, Jenkins argues that his model can 
improve legal analysis. The matrix, carefully applied, does not lead 
inevitably to a "right" decision but, especially in difficult cases, it 
clarifies issues, exposes hidden consequences, and guides decision-
makers toward "an outcome that is reasoned and principled" (p. 62). 
In the second half of his book, Jenkins applies his theory to con-
crete legal problems such as regulation of state mental hospitals, 
forced busing to achieve racial integration, and affirmative action. 
The trenchant analyses of legal failure that Social Order consistently 
offers effectively advocate the theses that the law is a secondary in-
strument of social order and that the law cannot successfully with-
stand the burdens of social change placed on it by reformers. 
Jenkins's controversial conclusions regarding human rights in gen-
eral and affirmative action in particular should attract attention. 
The continued recognition of positive "human rights" that obligate 
the state to provide social groups with material resources, Jenkins 
argues, can only result in the sacrifice of civil rights that restrict gov-
ernmental power over individuals. He effectively questions whether 
the sacrifice of formal equality inherent in affirmative action pro-
grams will really be outweighed by ultimate gains in social equality. 
While Jenkins forcefully argues his case for the limits of the law, 
he fails to demonstrate the usefulness of his conceptual scheme. In-
serted among his criticisms of affirmative action, for example, is the 
almost casual assertion that "these mistakes could have been fore-
seen and guarded against if these programs had been drafted in the 
context and with full consciousness of ... [the] matrix of law" (pp. 
283-84). In fact, the explication of Jenkins's familiar arguments that 
affirmative action both impermissibly disadvantages nonminority 
groups and undermines "general standards of competence and 
achievement" (p. 285) does not require his rather confusing matrix. 
Jenkins's attempt to locate his various arguments in the dimensions 
of the Many, One, Process, and Pattern seems strained. The extreme 
abstraction inherent in his all-encompassing, ill-defined categories 
renders analysis in their terms extraordinarily, perhaps impossibly, 
difficult. It is not difficult to imagine proponents of affirmative ac-
tion casting their conclusions in Jenkins's categorical terminology. 
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But no one is likely to be enlightened or persuaded by the ensuing 
semantic debate. Resort to abstract ontological conceptions, in 
short, will likely do more to confuse than to clarify legal issues. 
Another of Jenkins's examples, the failure of injunctions to effec-
tuate reforms in mental hospitals, illustrates this fundamental prob-
lem. It seems unlikely that a judge unimpressed by the situation-
specific argument. that an injunction would retard the morale and 
efficiency of the professional staff and thus undermine effective ther-
apy would be persuaded by the same concerns because they had 
been expressed as admonitions to remember the "regime of possibil-
ity." Unfortunately, Jenkins's matrix does not illuminate the diffi-
cult moral and empirical questions involved in the issues that he 
addresses. One hopes that decision-makers, rather than clothing 
their thoughts in metaphysical abstraction, will squarely pose and 
answer these more concrete problems. 
Jenkins is at an impressive best when addressing particular in-
stances of the overextension of law, but that is not his purpose. So-
cial Order instead seeks a comprehensive theory of positive law that 
will facilitate the analysis of close questions oflaw and public policy. 
But the ambiguous abstraction needed to construct a universal 
model has resulted in a categorical system so inclusive that it appears 
at best clumsy, at worst incomprehensible and me!l,ningless. 
